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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 194 
Accident time: 14:00 Accident Date: 27/01/1994 
Where it occurred: Bosknor - Chey Mean 
Chey, Banan District, 
Battambang province 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 29/01/1994 
ID original source: NS (date inferred) Name of source: CMAC/MAG 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: metal fragments 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: 9320 2330 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group were using a two-man drill. In this, one 
deminer uses the detector and marks any signals. A second deminer checks for tripwires, 
cuts undergrowth and investigates any detector readings.  
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An internal demining group accident report was written by their "Senior Specialist" after a site 
visit on 28th January 1994. The report was found at file at the country MAC in January 1999. 
The following details of the accident are drawn from the statements of the victim's supervisor 
and partner because the report author provided no summary of events.  
At the time of the accident the victim was wearing boots, helmet and jacket and was retrieving 
his "goggles and scissors" from an area believed safe. [The group's "goggles" were in fact 
safety spectacles and "scissors" were shears.] 
After a "smoke break" the Supervisor went to the victim's lane to check the work. He used 
their detector which signalled and the tip of a bullet and two Type 72a mines were discovered.  
[It is unclear whether this was in an area they had declared clear or not: if not, he was 
checking the detector rather than their work.]  
The supervisor began to suspect that the detector was faulty but continued and the detector 
gave a low whistle. He prodded the suspect area and excavated by hand but found nothing. 
He then signalled to the expatriate Specialist to come and destroy the finds. 
When the expatriate arrived the deminers went into the lane to get their equipment. The victim 
was going to fetch "scissors and goggles". As they returned with their equipment the victim, 
who was three metres behind his partner, stood on a Type 72a mine. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigator concluded that the Schiebel AN 19/2 detector in use would locate a Type 72a 
under normal operating conditions, but had failed to detect a Type 72a just prior to the 
accident. 
The detector used was tested and found to be faulty. It passed the Schiebel set-up test but 
then failed to signal on a test Type 72a mine that gave readings to other detectors. The faulty 
detector was passed to the country MAC for examination. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigator recommended that all Schiebel detectors should be held in stores until 
checked by the manufacturer. Also that, due to the "anti-handling nature" of the Type 72a [this 
mine does not include an anti-handling device – the Type 72b does] and the "hard, dry 
ground conditions" prodding was too dangerous, so all the group's demining operations  in 
Cambodia should cease until the problem was resolved. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 247 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
2 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Inadequate equipment” because of the 
detector failure. The secondary cause is listed as “Field control inadequacy" because the 
victim trod on a mine that would have been found if appropriate field controls had been in 
place and if the detector inadequacy had been recognised in a timely manner.  
Given that six detectors had failed similarly [see Related papers], the problem should have 
been addressed before an accident occurred. 
 
Related papers 
A report on detector failure was prepared by the country MAC by an expatriate Technical 
Advisor. Dated 28th January 1994, it concluded that the detector was "prone to intermittent 
failure", and that the "fault has been identified to be with the cable from the search head to the 
box, with the join at the box being the location of the problem". The cable did not look faulty 
and the detector passed the standard tuning SOP. It detected a Type 72a on several 
occasions, was retuned, tested and retuned again. After the third retuning it was not able to 
detect the test mine and made an intermittent noise. 
The author felt that "there is a major problem with the detectors, and that their effectiveness 
and reliability is in serious doubt." He recommended that all detectors be withdrawn from 
operations until Schiebel themselves subjected the detectors to electronic tests. 
The demining group involved in the accident produced a brief report stating that they had six 
detectors with search head connection to control box faults. They had sent "at least 10" 
others back to the manufacturer in the past. The current faults were first brought to the 
attention of the Schiebel Sales representative in mid-December 1993.  
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